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In recognition of the signiﬁcant role the private sector can play in the
provision, ﬁnancing, and implementation of infrastructure projects, the
Philippine government has adopted speciﬁc measures to encourage private-
sector participation in infrastructure. The acute budgetary constraints fac-
ing the Philippine government motivated the entry of the private sector in
the provision of certain infrastructure services, which can be priced ac-
cordingly, thus making it possible to exclude nonpayers from the service.
Through user charges, the private investors can recover their investments
and generate proﬁts.
The passage of Republic Act 6957 or the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
Law in 1990, as amended by Republic Act 7718, provides the avenue for
tapping private-sector expertise and resources in infrastructure.1 The BOT
law provides the legal framework governing ﬁnancing, construction, and
operation of an infrastructure project that the government delegates to a
private proponent. The amended BOT law has increased the scope of
private-sector participation, providing for direct negotiation of contracts
and investment incentives in certain cases, and addressing the problem of
unsolicited proposals.2 Executive Order No. 215, issued in 1987, allowed
the private sector to invest in power generation. The Electric Power Indus-
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1. The amended BOT law allows for various modes of private participation: build-operate-
transfer, build-run-and-operate, build-transfer, build-lease-and-transfer, contract-add-operate,
develop-operate-transfer, rehabilitate-operate-transfer, and rehabilitate-own-operate.
2. The local government units have also entered into BOT-type arrangements with private
proponents for providing infrastructure in the local areas.try Reform Act (EPIRA) enacted in 2002, paved the way for greater
private-sector participation in the electric power industry. It laid down the
basis for competition in power generation and supply segments of the in-
dustry. Distribution and transmission of electricity have continued to be
monopolies. A newly created Energy Regulatory Commission was created
to regulate the price of transmission and distribution of electricity. The law
also created a National Transmission Company that will be initially set up
as a state monopoly but that will eventually be privatized.
Thus, the creation of a new infrastructure policy environment has been
rewarded by a surge in private investor interest and investments in various
infrastructure projects. In 1998 President Ramos reported that the BOT
law enabled government to enforce power projects on scale and speed that
was unprecedented worldwide. In one year alone (1996), the government
added 1,000 megawatts of capacity through BOT power plants. By the end
of 1993, the ten-hour power outage aﬀecting many metropolitan areas and
manufacturing establishments in 1990 to 1992 was eliminated.
To encourage private-sector participation in infrastructure, the Philip-
pine government has invariably provided state guarantees. This chapter
draws the attention of policymakers and legislators to the ﬁscal risk
brought by contingent liabilities arising from government guarantees given
to privately driven infrastructure projects. The unmitigated provision of
government guarantees has given rise to large amounts of contingent lia-
bilities that has created a serious ﬁscal risk for the government. The chap-
ter discusses the current attempt of the Philippine government to address
this outstanding issue. Drawing from existing literature (Lewis and Mody
1997, Mody and Patro 1996, Irwin et al. 1997, Mody 2000) the chapter
sketches how the Philippine government may organize a management
framework for contingent liabilities. It concludes by pointing out the need
for the government to develop credible regulatory and competition policy
frameworks to minimize the demand for guarantees in the future.
8.2 Demand for State Guarantees
Private proponents faced the daunting problem of entering highly regu-
lated and distorted markets for infrastructure, where political patronage
and intervention present grave constraints to eﬃcient operation. Con-
fronted with the problem of providing services in a highly politically
charged environment, private providers seek state guarantees on a wide va-
riety of perceived risks. Economic and political uncertainties increase the
cost of investing in a country. Mody (2000) explains the provision of gov-
ernment guarantees as a necessary step in view of the fact that the transi-
tion from government infrastructure monopoly to multiple private infra-
structure providers would require signiﬁcant investments in regulatory
258 Gilberto M. Llantocapacity and since such capacity cannot be built overnight, contractually
speciﬁed public-private partnerships are necessary intermediate steps in a
rapid infrastructure development strategy. Government guarantees serve
as second-best instruments in the absence of a stable political environment,
eﬀective regulatory bodies, independent judicial systems, and an overall
competitive climate.3 Thus, a crucial condition of an eﬀective public-
private partnership in infrastructure projects is the provision of state guar-
antees.
The ﬁscally challenged Philippine government realizes it has a duty to
provide its citizens adequate and better infrastructure services. It has
turned to the private sector to ﬁll the huge gap in infrastructure services
that the government felt impossible to address given a debilitating ﬁscal
deﬁcit. To encourage private investments in infrastructure services, private
proponents or investors should be able to recover costs and generate nor-
mal proﬁts from the endeavor. It would be critical to allow the private in-
vestor the freedom to set tariﬀs or user charges that would adequately
cover costs as well as generate proﬁts. Since they were bringing risk capital
to the project, the private investors wanted an assurance of adequate return
to their investments and recovery of invested capital. Awareness of the
diﬃculty of charging cost-recovering tariﬀs or user charges in heavily
politicized environments, unfamiliarity with the Philippines and weak-
nesses in the regulatory framework only whetted their appetite for govern-
ment guarantees.
Government guarantees create contingent liabilities that could spell ﬁ-
nancial trouble for the government if not properly managed. In the drive to
motivate private-sector participation in infrastructure, especially in the en-
ergy sector, the Philippine government provided guarantees that covered a
wide variety of project-speciﬁc and general risks (Llanto and Soriano
1997). The expectation was that high Philippine economic growth could be
sustained in the future, which would somehow avert guarantee calls.
8.3 Experience with Government Guarantees to BOT Projects
The BOT scheme is a contractual arrangement between the government
and the private proponent that obligates the latter to ﬁnance and construct
an infrastructure project for the government, and operate and maintain the
facility during the cooperation period established in a contract. During the
cooperation period, the proponent can charge rent, user charges, and toll
fees to recover his or her investment outlay and generate a reasonable re-
turn to investment. The private sector brings not only ﬁnancing for the
project but also cost eﬃciencies together with operating know-how and
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3. See Ashoka Mody 2000.technical advantage.4 Thus, the government used the BOT schemes to ad-
dress the power crisis and, more recently, to move other infrastructure,
such as the Manila Skyway Project, the light railway system along Metro
Manila’s main highway (EDSA MRT III), and others, from the drawing
tables to the project-implementation stage.
8.3.1 Private Power Generation
The government has privatized power generation in a bid to provide
greater eﬃciency in the power sector after the government realized the in-
adequacies of state provision of power and the regulatory and clearance
procedures in that sector. The ﬁrst successful project was the 200 megawatt
(MW) Hopewell Navotas I, which began operation and was synchronized
with the National Power Corporation (NPC) grid in 1991. The Ramos gov-
ernment extensively used BOT arrangements to lick the power crisis, be-
lieving that private-sector participation was the best way to increase power
generation capacity in the shortest possible time. The government and
NPC launched a fast track program with some 10 suppliers for additional
power-generation capacity of about 1,000 MW within 18 months. By the
end of 1993, the power crisis was history after the private sector responded
positively to its new-found role. Between 1992 and mid-1994, the govern-
ment and NPC had about 24 more BOT contracts. Initially, the arrange-
ments were done on a transaction by transaction basis with individual
project sponsors because of the urgency of the situation and the lack of ex-
perience with BOT schemes in the country. The resultant contractual
agreements called for the implementation of those projects on a cost plus
or a minimum rate of return basis. As the economy recovered and private
capital regained conﬁdence in the country, the government awarded more
recent contracts on a competitive basis.
As of 1994, more than 35 power plants accounting for some 5,000 MW
were either already in production or under active development/construction
with a total cost of U.S. $5 billion. According to the Department of Energy,
except for hydro and geothermal power, all future power-generation ca-
pacity will be with the private sector.
Because the power crisis was the single most important constraint to
economic recovery and growth in the early 1990s, the government accepted
the installation of peak-load power plants that provided the much needed
power but at a relatively higher cost to the consumer. After the power cri-
sis eased up, the government sought less expensive power projects.
During the fast track period of installing more power capacity through
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4. Private power projects were completed at lower costs and used 25 percent to 30 percent
less time than public projects. In Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Macau, private conces-
sionaires of water supply projects have reduced unaccounted water from 50 percent to 60 per-
cent of the total to 15 percent to 25 percent and staﬃng costs by 30 percent to 50 percent
(Kohli 1995).the BOT schemes, independent power producers (IPPs) required compre-
hensive government guarantees to cover sovereign, foreign exchange con-
vertibility, market, and credit risks. The private proponents required com-
prehensive guarantee coverage in exchange for a commitment to install in
the shortest possible time much-needed generation capability. In view of its
inability to ﬁnance and install the required generation capability because
of severe budgetary constraints and very limited access to the capital mar-
kets, the government had no choice but to grant guarantees sought by
private proponents, including guarantees for National Power Corporation’s
(NPC) obligations, take or payundertakings. The government through NPC
and the private proponents agreed to have Purchased Power Agreements
(PPAs), which required the government to pay for the building of capacity
or power plants needed to ensure there is adequate supply of electricity,
and reserve electricity in case a few power plants bog down.
Ideally, the government should have provided guarantees only to funda-
mental risks, such as sovereign and political risks. Subsequent BOT proj-
ects seemed to indicate the country’s progress in attaining an improved
credit standing in the international capital markets, which enabled govern-
ment to provide less comprehensive risk coverage. This is seen in BOT ar-
rangements in toll road construction and in urban mass transit system.
8.3.2 Tollways Construction
The project was the construction of a 25.5 kilometer toll road costing
U.S. $500 million connecting Metro Manila to Cavite province.5 The gov-
ernment awarded a 35-year BOT concession to a joint venture between a
private-sector consortium and the government’s Public Estates Authority.
The government’s guarantee cover was limited to political and sovereign
risks, including right of way, force majeure during construction and oper-
ation, and cost escalation arising from variations in design. A guarantee on
the adjustment of toll rates assured the proponents compensation for any
shortfall in toll revenues arising from the nonimplementation of an agreed-
upon parametric adjustment of toll rates. While the government took the
tariﬀ risks, all other commercial and market risks (e.g., the volume of
traﬃc that will actually use the toll road) were absorbed by the private in-
vestors and lenders.
8.3.3 Light Railway System
This involved the construction of a 17-kilometer light railway system tra-
versing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The U.S. $650 million
project was awarded to the private sector on a 25-year build-lease-transfer
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5. Drawn from the speech of Secretary of Finance, Roberto de Ocampo, in the High Level
Conference on Frontiers of the Public-Private Interface in East Asia’s Infrastructure, Jakarta,
Indonesia, September 3, 1996.arrangement. The original plan was to ﬁnance the project from commer-
cial borrowing from foreign capital markets with the government provid-
ing only fundamental guarantees. However, government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the De-
partment of Finance (DOF), took the initiative of helping the private-sector
consortium negotiate for lower ﬁnancing costs with the senior lenders of the
projects. The government guaranteed the lease payments of DOTC to the
proponents with conﬁrmation from DOF that the obligations carry the full
faith and credit of the Republic of the Philippines. With this performance
undertaking, the interest rate to investors was brought down from 20 per-
cent to 15 percent. The project was also made more commercially attractive
to the private-sector consortium by awarding them the right to commercial
development in the depot and stations. The private-sector consortium
would have to pay lease to the government. Thus, the fare revenues will be
supplemented by revenues from commercial developments.
8.4 Contingent Liabilities in Infrastructure Projects
In the Philippines, Llanto and Soriano (1997) ﬁrst raised the problem of
the ﬁscal risk of contingent liabilities arising from the provision of govern-
ment guarantees to infrastructure projects. The provision of comprehen-
sive guarantees to infrastructure projects has generated huge contingent
liabilities that must be managed well; otherwise the government will be
exposed to substantial payment burdens once a guarantee call is triggered.
Subsequent studies (Llanto et al. 1999; Bernardo et al. 2004) conﬁrmed
this as a potentially very serious ﬁscal problem if not properly managed by
the government. Table 8.1 shows project-speciﬁc risks in certain sectors
that impelled private proponents to ask for government guarantees.
8.5 Risks Most Commonly Shouldered by Government
The most often shouldered risks by the national government in BOT-
type projects are the following:
• Site availability.The government guarantees right-of-way for the proj-
ect. This involves purchasing the site for the project as well as relocat-
ing people who will be aﬀected by the project;
• Market risk.If the buyer of the service is a government entity, the gov-
ernment typically agrees to minimum oﬀ-take contract purchases and
prices (take or pay arrangements). These have the eﬀect of guarantee-
ing a market for the output of the proponent (e.g., power, water);
• Payment risk. If the buyer of the service is a government entity, the
government guarantees contractual performance;
262 Gilberto M. LlantoTable 8.1 Selected project-speciﬁc risks and sectoral examples
Type of project-speciﬁc risks Sectoral examples
Project-performance risks Power—Power purchase agreements refer to minimum power plan 
High cost of service performance criteria that the proponent has to satisfy.
Bad/inefﬁcient service Water—MWSS concession agreement states the minimum criteria 
for project performance to be satisﬁed by the proponent. The 
concessionaires would bear the risk of poor project performance if 
they are penalized by the MWSS Regulatory Ofﬁce.
Transport—Most toll road concession agreements state the minimum 
criteria for project performance to be satisﬁed by the proponent.
Project-completion risks Power—NPC normally guarantees right-of-way and site availability 
Delays for power projects.
Cost overruns Water—The MWSS concession agreement stipulates that cost 
Site availability overruns in projects may be passed onto consumers provided they 
are covered in grounds for extraordinary price adjustments (EPAs). 
Otherwise, such costs are borne by the concessionaires.
Transport—Responsibility for constructing access and feeder roads 
necessary for ensuring the viability of many toll roads are assumed 
by the government.
Fuel and other inputs risk Power—In many instances, power purchase agreements include 
Fuel availability commitments by National Power Corporation (also the off-taker) 
Skilled labor to guarantee the supply of fuel inputs for independent power
producers.
Water—The MWSS concession agreement transfers input risk to the 
concessionaire, unless there are grounds for extraordinary price 
adjustments.
Transport—Inputs for road and bridge construction are usually
carried by the contractor.
Market risk Power—At the height of the power crisis, the government agreed to 
User demand for services bear signiﬁcant market risks by adopting minimum off-take 
contracts with independent power producers.
Water—The MWSS concession agreement transfers market risk to the 
concessionaire. However, a number of bulk water service contracts 
with pending approvals have minimum off-take provisions with 
government-owned off-takers.
Transport—The MRT-3 contract includes a stipulation of minimum 
ridership levels, below which government must compensate the 
contractor.
Payment risk Power—All power purchase agreements stipulate that NPC’s 
Creditworthiness of  commitments carry a full government guarantee for minimum 
buyers of output off-take amounts. Thus, the relevant credit risk is that of NPC 
and government.
All PPAs carry a buyout clause the IPP may invoke in case NPC 
commits a breach of contract or fails to make required payments 
to IPPs.
Water—Many proposed service contracts between bulk water 
providers and off-takers, usually municipal water districts, carry \
guarantees of payment from the latter. Thus, the relevant credit risk 
is of the municipal water districts or the municipal government.
Transport—There is no off-taker in most transport projects.
(continued)Financial risk Power—All PPAs carry a buyout clause the IPP may invoke in case 
Debt service coverage there is a change in circumstance that materially reduces or 
Security prejudices the IPP return and the parties are unable to agree to a 
On-going compliance change in the contract after a deﬁned period (guaranteed rate of
return risk). In addition, most capacity payments are tailored to cover
the project sponsor’s debt services plus a fair rate of return.
Water—In the MWSS Concession Agreement, the government does 
not assume ﬁnancial risk. This is instead passed onto the
concessionaires.
Transport—Debt service coverage is a risk assumed by private 
operators in the case of toll roads.
Country environment risk Power—All PPAs carry a buyout clause the IPP may invoke in case 
Expropriation there is a change in law or regulations, and if compliance with such 
Regulatory interference laws results in:
Concession revoked 1. The power station being unable to operate; or
Legal framework 2. The interest of the operator in the project and the operator’s 
Environmental approval expectation of its return on investment being materially and 
Foreign exchange adversely affected,
and the parties are unable to agree to an amendment of the PPA 
after the deﬁned period of negotiation (legal framework risk).
All PPAs carry a buyout clause the IPP may invoke in case there is a 
force majeure event that is within the reasonable control of the 
government or NPC that lasts for a deﬁned period and the parties 
are unable to agree to a contract revision. In a few cases, this applies 
to all force majeure events (force majeure risk).
Many PPAs carry a buyout clause the IPP may invoke in case the NPC 
is privatized and this effectively results in a real or purported
assignment of rights or assumption of obligations under this
agreement or materially and adversely changes its net assets,
projected proﬁts, projected net cash ﬂow from operations, or
otherwise would prompt a reasonable person to conclude that the
ability of NPC or its successor entity to duly perform its obligations
under the PPA on a timely basis has been materially and adversely
affected.
Water—In setting the concession fee equivalent to the annual debt 
amortization payments of MWSS, the MWSS concession agreement
effectively transfers the responsibility for paying MWSS loans to the
concessionaires. Since these loans have been contracted in foreign
currency, the concessionaires bear the risk. However, the
concessionaires have cited the devaluation of the peso in their latest
petition for EPA before the MWSS Appeals Board. There are no
automatic adjustment mechanisms for passing these risks to
consumers.
Transport—In toll road agreements, most of the country environment 
risks are assumed by the government.
Source: Llanto et al. (1999).
Note: The Philippines no longer guarantees foreign exchange rates at the time of conversion. What is
more prevalent is a guarantee of convertibility of domestic currency into foreign exchange.
Table 8.1 (continued)
Type of project-speciﬁc risks Sectoral examples• Change in law risk. The government assures proponents that changes
in the legal framework will not aﬀect contractual agreements;
• Foreign exchange risk.The government/central bank agrees to provide
forward cover for the proponent. This will entail either: (a) ensuring
that foreign exchange is made available for the project; or that (b) for-
eign exchange may be purchased through a forward contract for de-
livery at a later date. A common problem is the currency mismatch
where project revenues are peso-denominated while debt repayments
are in foreign currency. The failure to have cost-recovering tariﬀs 
will prevent raising the necessary peso amounts to cover a foreign-
currency denominated debt; and
• Regulatory and political risk. Regulatory risk concerns the implemen-
tation of regulation that would have adverse impact on the ﬁnancial
viability of the project. For example, in toll road projects, the govern-
ment through the Toll Regulatory Board guarantees that toll adjust-
ment shall be in accordance with a parametric formula determined for
the project. Political risks may include changes in law, war, hostilities,
belligerence, revolution, insurrection, riot, public disorders, or terror-
ist acts.
Of the previous risks mentioned, the provision of guarantees to cover
market risks and buyouts in the event of project termination contribute the
greatest share to increases in the contingent liabilities of government (table
8.2). The amount of uncertainty inherent in the transition period—from a
state of direct government provision to a state of privatization and the long
gestation period of infrastructure projects—implies that when such guar-
antees are provided, the government shoulders a larger proportion of the
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Table 8.2 Largest sources of contingent liabilities
Item guaranteed Cost
Power sector
1. Buyout clause or termination Buyout or termination price
2. Force Majeure Buyout or termination price
Transport sector
1. Toll changes; automatic toll adjustment  Costs of inability to implement toll 
formula adjustments
Water sector (MWSS)
1. MWSS to assume loans being paid by  Cost of principal and interest on old 
concessionaire MWSS loans
2. MWSS to pay early termination fee Early termination amount
3. Lower of appeal to pay total cost of  Cost of appeals process
appeal process for both parties
4. Force Majeure Early termination amountrisk of insuﬃcient market demand, adverse exchange rate ﬂuctuations, and
other negative shocks.
8.6 Contingent Liabilities of the Philippine Government
Total estimated contingent liabilities as of 2003 was P1,672 billion (U.S.
$30.4 billion; see table 8.3).6Accounting for liabilities that have become ac-
tual, total liabilities amount to P1,455 billion. The total estimated value,
however, does not include exposures from unfunded liabilities of the social
security institutions and implicit contingent liabilities that may arise from
defaults on nonguaranteed debts and collapse due to capital outﬂows. A
2003 report of the Commission on Audit on the Government Service In-
surance System (GSIS) reported the institution’s actuarial reserve deﬁ-
ciency at P5.24 billion. On the other hand, the Social Security System
(SSS) valuation report in 1999 revealed that a portion of its assets would be
used for beneﬁt payments by 2008 and the fund would last until 2015 as-
suming there would be no across-the-board increases in beneﬁts. If there
would be annual across-the-board increases, assets would be used starting
2004 and the fund would last till 2012. SSS is currently updating its actu-
arial valuations.
The contingent liabilities of the infrastructure sector comprised 54 per-
cent of total contingent liabilities estimated by the Department of Finance.
BOT projects had a share of 18.5 percent while buy-out costs of indepen-
dent power producers (IPPs) made up 35 percent. Guarantees on projects
and activities of government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs)
and government ﬁnancial institutions (GFI) loans were 43 percent of the
total estimate. Guarantee institutions had 3 percent of the total estimate.
Table 8.4 lists the government corporations and ﬁnancial institutions
that have provided government guarantees. The charters of some of those
government corporations allow them to issue sovereign guarantee. Once
the guarantee is called upon by the private investor, the national govern-
ment becomes liable for payment. The table also rates the likelihood of
these guarantees to be called, with the Light Rail Transit Authority, Na-
tional Food Authority, and Philippine National Railways having the high-
est likelihood of being called. Guarantees on the National Power Corpo-
ration (NPC) and Technology Livelihood Resource Center equivalent to
P200 billion and P0.32 billion, respectively, are already to be assumed by
the national government. Among the GOCCs, NPC presents the highest
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6. The estimates for contingent liabilities were based on reports of several key government
agencies and external consultants. The report was compiled from the monitoring activities of
the Department of Finance (DOF) on the cash ﬂows of GOCCs as well as IPP reports from
the National Power Corporation (NPC). Consultants were contracted in 2003 to quantify the
contingent liabilities in BOT projects. As the central ﬁnance management oﬃce, DOF main-
tains information and annually updates the ﬁnancial positions of GOCCs.risk both in likelihood and cost. The government should review the con-
tracts entered upon by those GOCCs and monitor the guarantees and the
concomitant contingent liabilities arising from those contracts. Oﬀ-budget
obligations such as guarantees provided by GOCC may give rise to a ﬁscal
shock unless monitored and budgeted by the national government.
Republic Act 4860 sets a ceiling of U.S. $7.5 million on outstanding
guarantees of foreign loans of GOCCs. However, some corporations have
been exempted from the guarantee ceiling: Light Rail Transit Authority,
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, National Development
Corporation, National Electriﬁcation Administration, National Irrigation
Administration, Philippine National Oil Company, and Philippine Na-
tional Railways. The national government charges a ﬁxed annual guaran-
tee fee of 1 percent regardless of the risk proﬁle of the guaranteed loan or
the institution. However, because the accounting system is still cash based,
the fees collected are treated as part of the general revenues and are not
kept in separate accounts to fund potential guarantee calls.7
Table 8.5 shows the maximum estimated exposure from independent
power producers (IPPs). Liability exposures from private-sector participa-
tion in infrastructure projects are itemized in table 8.6. As of year-end
2003, the national government has made payments of P11,572 million and
P5,258 million on behalf of MRT3 Project and Casecnan, respectively, for
a total of P16,831 million. In this case, the contingent liabilities have be-
come actual liabilities.
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7. See Bernardo and Tang 2001.
Table 8.3 Estimated contingent liabilities as of December 31, 2003
Amount Amount
Types of contingent liabilities Php billion U.S.$ billion
Guarantee on GOCC/GFI loansa 723.90 13.16
Guarantee Institutionsb 51.50 0.94
Guarantee on PSP (BOT) projects 308.85 5.62
Buyout of IPPsc 587.l40 10.68
Total 1,671.65 30.40
Source: DOF.
aExcludes NG loans relent to GOCCs amounting to U.S.$2,05 billion or Php112.77 billion.
Pertains to outstanding principal balance only.
bGuarantees on deposit insurance was not included because there are no provisions in the
PDIC Charter that provides for NG guarantee on its obligations.
cBeginning January 2005.
dExcludes potential NG exposure for the social security institutions.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.8.7 Attempts to Manage Contingent Liabilities
The Department of Finance (DOF) is in charge of overall monitoring of
contingent liabilities. Two interagency committees (namely, [a] the Devel-
opment Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC) composed of the De-
partment of Finance, National Economic and Development Authority, 
the Department of Budget and Management, and other agencies; and [b]
the NEDA Investment Coordinating Committee [ICC]) both work with
DOF at monitoring contingent liabilities. The DBCC regularly deliberates
on possible claims arising from contingent liabilities and factors these in the
budget program. The national government has required all government
agencies and GOCCs to seek the approval of the DOF prior to entering into
negotiations for foreign loans through Administrative Order 19 in October
2002. A more recent eﬀort was the setting up of a taskforce on Debt and
Risk Management within DOF in December 2004, which will be the pri-
mary unit responsible for monitoring and managing contingent liabilities.
A contingent liability becomes an assumed liability of the national gov-
ernment only after getting the recommendation of DBCC to absorb the li-
ability. When this happens, the Department of Budget and Management
prepares to service the liability, using as legal basis the automatic appro-
priations provision under the General Appropriations Act. A recent devel-
opment is the preparation by the Department of Budget and Management
of a draft bill entitled the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which has been sub-
mitted and is currently being studied by the Senate. One of the salient
points of the draft bill is the repeal of the automatic guarantees that certain
government-owned and -controlled corporations can provide under their
respective charters. This will free the national government of an obligatory
ﬁnancial burden arising from calls on guarantees provided by GOCCs,
thus, mitigating ﬁscal risk. The draft also calls for greater transparency and
accountability in the public sector.
The Philippines is still in the process of deﬁning an eﬀective strategy for
managing contingent liabilities. Apart from setting a debt cap, charging a
uniform 1 percent annual guarantee fee, and the automatic appropriations
once the guarantee is called, the government has yet to come up with a
more eﬃcient system of budgeting for the contingent liabilities. A direction
for reform suggested by Brixi and Mody (2002) is accrual-based budgeting
that is built upon an accrual-based accounting platform. Under this system
of budgeting, the net present ﬁscal cost of contingent liabilities will be in-
cluded in budget documents. The government may be able to analyze the
ﬁscal impact of contingent liabilities sooner than when they become actual
liabilities. Thus, this helps the government to more eﬀectively manage
them. This would include proper accounting of all contingent liabilities in
their net present values. The government will be able to include anticipated
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sional appropriation.
There is now an urgent need to set up a management framework that
would take into account the screening, accounting, budgeting, and provi-
sioning of contingent liabilities.
8.8 Toward a Management Framework
This leads to several issues that the Philippine government must work
on:8 (a) an improved framework for the grant of guarantees; (b) account-
ing, budgeting, monitoring, and management of contingent liabilities; (c)
policies that reduce risks including the promotion of competition and de-
veloping eﬃcient regulatory frameworks; and (d) maintaining a sound
macroeconomic environment.
8.8.1 Framework for Providing Guarantees
The government should recognize that a guarantee cover is not a free re-
source that government can grant at will. It represents actual claims on
government’s ﬁscal resources once certain future events trigger a guaran-
tee call. Without an eﬃcient allocation of this resource, the government
could ﬁnd itself in a ﬁscal shock once private investors call on guarantees
that have been given without regard for eﬃcient allocation principles.
Correct pricing of the guarantee may help ensure an eﬃcient allocation.
This means that pricing the guarantee should consider market conditions
and relative project risks. A ﬁrst approximation may relate the guarantee
fee to the market price of a long-term government security or bond in the
absence of a history or pattern of guarantee calls. The guarantee cover
could be seen as a form of insurance made available by the government to
the project proponent, which will be paid once a guarantee trigger brings
about the call. Since the insurance cover constitutes an allocation of gov-
ernment resources to the project, the premium or fee should be based on
the opportunity cost of the allocated resource. There is also a great advan-
tage in calibrating the guarantee fee according to the relative risks in in-
frastructure projects. Thus, government should identify all the possible
risks that can aﬀect the project, rank them according to their weight and
likelihood of occurrence, and determine what speciﬁc risks the government
is willing to cover. Risk-adjusted and market-based guarantee fee will cre-
ate the proper incentives for private demand for that cover, thereby ensur-
ing allocation eﬃciency.
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8. The discussion on the principles and approach behind guarantee provision and manage-
ment of contingent liabilities draws on Mody, Lewis, Irwin, and others. This section also
draws on Gilberto M. Llanto 2004.A nonprice-allocation mechanism for guarantee cover is the govern-
ment’s ranking of infrastructure projects that would be given such cover.
This will require a thorough evaluation of the projects’ relative social ben-
eﬁts and costs and of the diﬀerent projects’ contribution to the attainment
of desired development outcomes. Reference to the Medium-Term Public
Investment Program as well as the budgetary deliberations of the Devel-
opment Budget Coordinating Committee could provide guidance on the
relative ranking of projects. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that
political interests may inﬂuence the ranking of infrastructure projects. The
reality is that decisions by policymakers are inﬂuenced by technical, eco-
nomic, and political considerations. It will be very important to ensure
transparency of the policy debates, the arguments given, and the ultimate
choices made by policymakers.
The government should determine the amount of guarantee cover it can
prudently provide in any given year. This amount should include not only
those granted to infrastructure projects but also to other guarantee pro-
grams implemented by various government agencies, especially those that
have the nature of sovereign guarantees. In some instances, the national
government gives only an indirect guarantee, since the ﬁrst recourse of the
private investor is the balance sheet of the sponsoring government agency.
However, this also exposes the government to contingent liabilities and
thus indirect guarantees should be considered in the overall appreciation
of how much guarantee the government can provide at any given time.
Contingent liabilities should compete on equal footing (e.g., in budget-
ary terms) with other forms of ﬁnancial support, such as direct subsidies,
tax exemptions, loans, and so on, so that the choice for more contingent li-
abilities does not lessen public ﬁnance eﬃciency.9
A vital principle is to unbundle and assign risks to the party most ca-
pable of managing them, or whose actions have a direct bearing on their
outcome. Thus, a risk-sharing arrangement with private parties shall re-
duce demand for government guarantee and minimize government’s expo-
sure to contingent liabilities. The sharing of risks has to be reﬂected in the
contracts to be executed between the contracting parties. One advantage of
a risk-sharing arrangement is the minimization of moral hazard in imple-
menting projects.
The provision only of a set of core guarantees to BOT projects, which
should also be extended to concession arrangements, merits serious con-
sideration. The core guarantees should cover only (a) fundamental risks, for
example, uninsurable political risks; (b) fundamental rights, for example,
repatriation of proﬁts; and (c) foreign exchange convertibility. Fundamen-
tal rights bind the BOT proponent to undertake the project in full accor-
dance with the terms of the contract. These require government to grant
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against direct or indirect government takeover unless agreed upon based
on a termination or buyout provision of the project contract. Foreign ex-
change convertibility guarantees the BOT proponent’s right to (a) pur-
chase foreign exchange in the open market; (b) transfer its foreign currency
funds abroad; and (c) maintain foreign currency bank accounts in the
Philippines or abroad. To be neutral, the core guarantees will be applicable
to all sectors and are impartial to all types of projects.10
Related to this is the recommendation for government to adopt a selec-
tive and reasonable set of performance undertakings that are subject to a
fall-away clause. More speciﬁcally, there should be no guarantee cover for
commercial and market risks that appropriately belong to the private sec-
tor. The introduction of fall-away clauses in certain performance under-
takings will enable the national government to minimize its contingent lia-
bility exposure. Fall-away clauses were included in the 1200-MW Ilijan
Natural Gas Power Plant and San Pascual Cogeneration Power Plant proj-
ect agreements. For the Ilijan plant, the performance undertaking for the
availability fees shall fall away when the Philippines achieves consecutively
for two years an investment grade rating for its Philippine peso debt from
Standard and Poor, Moody’s, or other internationally recognized rating
agency of comparable standing.
The framework for giving guarantees should include an explicit exit
strategy for government guarantee. This will minimize government’s risk
exposure and potential burden on its ﬁscal position. The exit strategy will
prevent perverse incentives and moral hazard in project management and
implementation. For example, the government could design a contract that
provides for a fall-away of government guarantee for foreign exchange
convertibility once the country attains investment-grade rating in interna-
tional capital markets.11
The duration of the guarantee cover or the period of cooperation be-
tween the sponsoring agency/national government and the project propo-
nent is another crucial factor in providing guarantees. IPPs’ experience in
the power sector seems to show that the lengthier the time period within
which the guarantee call can be exercised, the more likely it will be exer-
cised by the project proponent. Thus, a higher guarantee fee or premium
could be required. The guarantee fee should also be reviewed annually by
DOF, the sponsoring agency, and the project proponent to account for
changes in business circumstances and, more generally, to give the depart-
ment the ﬂexibility to determine guarantee fees. The market is very dy-
namic and circumstances aﬀecting the infrastructure project change. Thus,
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10. Drawn from NEDA-ICC Policy Workshop on BOT and Related Policies, May 14, 1999,
Tektite Building, Pasig City.
11. See Llanto and Soriano 1997.there is a need for a regular review of project performance and a reassess-
ment of the guarantee cover provided to the project.
In summary, the suggested framework for government guarantee has the
following components:
• treatment of guarantee cover as a scarce resource that should be eﬃ-
ciently allocated
• determination of the annual amount of guarantee cover that govern-
ment can provide
• pricing of a guarantee according to market conditions and relative
risks
• risk sharing between project proponent and government
• core guarantees for selected risks
• core guarantees to be applicable to all sectors and all projects
• exit strategy or fall-away clause in guarantee contracts
• guarantee fee based on cooperation period
• annual review of project performance and required guarantee cover
8.8.2 Programming and Allocation of Guarantees
Together with monitoring, the programming and allocation of govern-
ment guarantee will provide government useful information on the value
of contingent liabilities and the amount of guarantee ex ante that can be
reasonably provided without unduly exposing the government to unman-
ageable ﬁscal risk. In this respect, there is a need for a system of ranking or
prioritizing access to the government’s guarantee. At the moment, there
are no internally consistent programming and allocation rules, much less
provisioning for potential guarantee calls. An unanticipated call will pro-
duce a ﬁscal shock, forcing government to tap the debt market at a high
cost in order to pay the claims of the aﬀected party.
8.8.3 Accounting, Budgeting, Monitoring, and Management of
Contingent Liabilities
The governments do not usually account for contingent liabilities be-
cause they follow cash-based budgeting. Thus, a government loan is actu-
ally recorded as an outﬂow but the government guarantee is not recorded
because nothing has been spent during the accounting period. The cost of
the guarantee is accounted for only when a guarantee call and the ensuing
guarantee payment occur. This is myopic. For ﬁscal prudence, there is thus
a need for an accounting and budgeting system that will take into consid-
eration contingent liabilities. Lewis and Mody (1997) note that cash-based
budgeting misrepresents and masks the aggregate exposure associated
with loan guarantees and government insurance programs and creates per-
verse incentives for selecting one form of ﬁnancing assistance over another.
The failure to account for the true cost of guarantees leads to the expan-
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without requiring the government to reserve for future claims or losses.
The Philippine government has to introduce reforms into its budgetary
system and processes and, in this case, scrutinize the budgetary impact of
direct and indirect guarantees. Monitoring the cost of the guarantee claims
and appropriating funds to service those claims only when those claims are
submitted encourage the extension of guarantees without having to con-
sider the costs, leaving future administrations vulnerable to huge claims.
Lewis and Mody (1997) emphasize that only by enforcing budgetary con-
trol at the time the ﬁnancial assistance (that is, in this case, the guarantee) is
committed can the appropriate budgetary incentives be realigned to elimi-
nate this moral hazard. A useful example of dealing with this situation is the
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 in the United States (see table 8.7).
The contingent liabilities generated by the provision of guarantees
should be carefully managed to minimize the costs of actual calls on the
government. An appropriate contingent liabilities management frame-
work could inform government’s decision on providing guarantees, expec-
tation of guarantee calls in the future, and the setting of reserves for the
contingent event. The underlying rule is, ﬁrst, to identify the diﬀerent types
of risks and, second, to determine the best way to improve their manage-
ment, whether by insuring, transferring, mitigating, or retaining the risk.
This approach, when adopted by the public sector, should take into ac-
count the government’s budgetary processes, the legal environment, and
the type of risks being evaluated.
The Philippine government has recognized the seriousness of the ﬁscal
risk created by contingent liabilities. Thus, the Department of Budget and
Management has included in the budget submitted to congress for appro-
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Table 8.7 The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990
A systematic accounting, monitoring, budgeting, and reporting of contingent liabilities
are important to serve as early warning to the government of potential guarantee calls and
the amount of government exposure. A good example of this practice is the requirement
under the U.S. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 for the budget to reﬂect the outlays
required to cover loan guarantees. Direct loans, guarantees, and grants are valued using a
ﬁnancially equivalent metric—the expected present value of future costs.
Each federal agency that administers credit programs has ﬁve accounts: a credit program
account, a ﬁnancing account, a liquidating account, a noncredit account, and a receipts
account. There are separate ﬁnancing accounts for loans and guarantees. In their annual
requests for budgets, agencies have to include estimates of the subsidy costs for new loans
and guarantees. If an agency exhausts its subsidy appropriations in a given year, it cannot
provide further credit assistance in that year. Funding to cover the expected present value of
future costs is charged against the appropriation for an agency when the direct loan or loan
guarantee is issued and the government’s commitment is extended. These costs or subsidies
must compete for budgetary resources on the same basis as other government spending.
Source: Lewis and Mody (1997).priation a line-item budget that is allocated for payment of contingent lia-
bilities that have turned to be actual liabilities following certain triggering
events. The Philippine government is also considering the establishment of
a debt and risk management oﬃce at the Department of Finance, which
shall monitor contingent liabilities and advise government on appropriate
action, among other responsibilities. However, the attempt to budget and
monitor is still in a rudimentary stage and the government still has to de-
velop its capacity for management of contingent liabilities.
8.8.4 Developing Eﬃcient Regulatory Frameworks and
Promoting Competition
There is a need for policies that reduce risks and raise expected returns
and can help attract private investments that do not depend on government
guarantees (Irwin et al. 1997).12An important component of those policies
is a credible regulatory and legal framework for the provision of infra-
structure services. Private investors have repeatedly indicated the weak
regulatory framework of the Philippines as a major factor deterring foreign
investments. For instance, in the water sector, certain consumer groups
such as NGOs have accused the lack of independence of the Regulatory
Oﬃce as responsible for the high water tariﬀs. On the other hand, private
business has rued their inability to charge cost-recovering tariﬀs because of
political intervention and, thus, the tendency of private proponents is to
ask for guarantees that cover this risk.
It is important to note that government risk-bearing is not necessarily
required by private investments in infrastructure. Irwin and others (1997)
call attention to the experience of the United Kingdom in attracting large
amounts of private investments despite its policy of not bearing even regu-
latory risks except where they relate speciﬁcally to a project. In Chile, pri-
vate investments in telecommunications, gas, and power were made with-
out government guarantees. In Argentina, reforms in the power industry
made it possible to get private investment without the government assum-
ing major risks (Klein 1996).13
The most important policy measure is to expose infrastructure service to
competition whenever possible. When monopolies are unavoidable, it is
important for government to establish laws and regulations that protect
property rights and to enforce them fairly and consistently (Irwin et al.
1997). Table 8.8 provides policies that reduce risks and increase expected
returns.
Privatization, deregulation, and liberalization in the infrastructure sec-
tor do not necessarily lead to unadulterated economic beneﬁts to the con-
sumer. As Joskow (1998) points out, there could still be segments of the in-
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12. See Irwin et al. 1997.
13. See Klein 1996.frastructure sector that are natural monopolies for which continuing regu-
lation would be needed to safeguard consumer welfare. At the same time,
an eﬀective regulatory presence is needed to ensure that potential com-
petitors are not barred from entry into the competitive segment of infra-
structure sectors. The Philippine government should recognize this as a
crucial component of its overall infrastructure policy and strategy for
private participation in infrastructure.
Eﬀective regulation would be necessary to ensure consumer welfare, es-
pecially where there are segments of the infrastructure sector that are nat-
ural monopolies.14 In the case of the electric power industry, the EPIRA
(RA 9136) created the Energy Regulatory Commission to promote com-
petition; safeguard consumer welfare; ensure performance and compli-
ance with health, safety, and environmental standards; and punish abuse
of market power. Prohibition against cross-ownership between subindus-
tries, concentration of ownership, and sourcing of power from bilateral
supply contracts is provided for under the EPIRA and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
Regulatory agencies should be independent and accountable. One of the
dangers of not having an independent and accountable agency is to have
pricing policies that can become highly politicized. This will prevent
private investors from recovering their costs and generating proﬁts, creat-
ing uncertainty about future income streams and magnifying the risks per-
ceived by private investors. Accountability is another hallmark of a good
regulatory agency. This will discourage arbitrariness in decision making
and potential abuse of regulatory power. Campos (1998) cites the need for
a judiciary environment that must be trusted by private investors and an
eﬀective and credible arrangement for appealing agency decisions to en-
sure accountability in a regulatory agency.15
All these point to the need to install a regulatory framework for the in-
frastructure sector that is clear, predictable, competent, and independent.
Such a regulatory framework will help minimize uncertainty and risks
faced by private investors and consumers alike and, thus, the need for gov-
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Table 8.8 Economy-wide options to reduce risks
• Establish expert and independent regulatory agencies
• Reform the constitution to impose limits on the power of the executive to act arbitrarily
• Strengthen the independence and quality of the judiciary
• Sign international treaties
• Agree to be bound by international arbitration
Source: Irwin et al. (1997).
14. See Joskow 1998.
15. See Campos 1998.ernment guarantees against certain risks. Clarity of procedures for bid and
award and dealing with disputes and unforeseen events in an infrastructure
sector are indispensable to private participation in the infrastructure sec-
tor. Certainty about government’s role in implementing commitments
(e.g., tariﬀ adjustment) gives private investors a measure of comfort and,
ﬁnally, a competitive environment assures the private proponent that it will
be able to charge tariﬀs or user charges that will enable it to recover costs
and generate proﬁts. This will also help minimize the need for guarantees
against market-related risks.
8.8.5 Sharing the Risks with the Private Sector
Public infrastructure projects carry various risks that may discourage
private sector ﬁnancing, construction, or operation. Unless the govern-
ment assumes some or all of the risks associated with the project, the econ-
omy will tend to underprovide it. The underlying rationale of the govern-
ment’s absorption of risks in public infrastructure projects is that the
project’s social return exceeds its private returns and that society will be
better oﬀ having the project than doing without it. Thus, a government
guarantee is given to project lenders and/or sponsors to minimize the at-
tendant risks of an infrastructure project and thereby, encourage private-
sector participation.
A practical approach in dealing with this problem of underprovision is
to identify and break down the risks associated with the infrastructure
project into several components and assign the component risks to the par-
ties that should absorb them. The key activities are:
• the optimal assignment of risks to the parties that should absorb them
• the minimization of the component risks through eﬃcient risk man-
agement
To encourage private-sector participation and performance in public in-
frastructure projects, the government and the private sector may agree on
the assignment of the component risks and the determination of the extent
of risk sharing. For instance, the government can guarantee the debt ex-
posure of private sector investors for a limited period of time.
The critical action to take then is to determine which risks are transfer-
able to the private sector and encourage greater private-sector share of
those risks. The delineation and sharing of component risks are necessary
to prevent perverse incentives that lead to project mismanagement, and to
avoid moral hazard problems such as relaxing on project monitoring and
concentrating on fund diversion. By taking on the full extent of the risk of
defaults, the government may end up holding the proverbial empty bag as
private lenders and sponsors take strategic action to capture rents at the ex-
pense of the government. The satisfactory allocation of risks between the
282 Gilberto M. Llantogovernment and the private sector is essential to the successful implemen-
tation of infrastructure projects.
8.8.6 Maintaining a Sound Macroeconomic Environment
Macroeconomic stability characterized by low inﬂation and low interest
rates will enable projects to have more certain cash streams and a positive
rate of return on investments. This will minimize the risks of guarantee
calls, especially in those instances when the government has been exposed
to buy-out clauses.
To build the conﬁdence of private investors in infrastructure, the Philip-
pine government needs to maintain a stable macroeconomic environment
and continue with economic and ﬁnancial reforms that will deepen the ﬁ-
nancial and capital markets. Infrastructure projects are vulnerable to cur-
rency and maturity risks, a source of uneasiness to the private investor. The
maturity structure of bank liabilities cannot simply match the long gesta-
tion of infrastructure projects. Hence there is a need to develop long-term
peso debt ﬁnance. This will also take care of currency risks that arise be-
cause the infrastructure project generates revenues in pesos while the loan
exposure is denominated in foreign currency.
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Comment Jason McDonald
The issue of how governments should manage their contingent liabilities is
receiving increasing attention internationally (see Polackova-Brixi and
Schick 2002). Dr. Llanto’s chapter contributes to this burgeoning literature
with a valuable examination of government-contingent liabilities in the
Philippines. The chapter analyzes the ﬁscal risks associated with contin-
gent liabilities, many of which are associated with private ﬁnancing ar-
rangements of public infrastructure, and proposes some possible manage-
ment solutions.
This increasing attention appears to be driven by two ﬁscal problems as-
sociated with governments using contingent liabilities. The ﬁrst is the pos-
sibility of increasing the adverse implications of macroeconomic risks.
Where such risks are not transparent, investors face increased uncertainty
as to the true extent of a government’s ﬁscal liabilities. Further, the ﬁscal
risks inherent in contingent liabilities may be systematically related—for
example, guarantees over exchange rate values in diﬀerent contracts can
easily crystallize at the same time. Finally, contingent liabilities have no
overt budgetary constraint (unlike traditional spending) that can hinder
macroeconomic control.
The second ﬁscal problem is the potential microeconomic distortions
from government’s using contingent liabilities where no market failures ex-
ist. In such cases, contingent liabilities contain an implicit subsidy (equal
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